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Quantum Information Processing, which is an exciting area of research at the intersection of physics
and computer science, has great potential for influencing the future development of information pro-
cessing systems. The building of practical, general purpose Quantum Computers may be some years
into the future. However, Quantum Communication and Quantum Cryptography are well developed.
Commercial Quantum Key Distribution systems are easily available and several QKD networks have
been built in various parts of the world. The security of the protocols used in these implementations
rely on information-theoretic proofs, which may or may not reflect actual system behaviour. More-
over, testing of implementations cannot guarantee the absence of bugs and errors. This paper presents
a novel framework for modelling and verifying quantum protocols and their implementations using
the proof assistant Coq. We provide a Coq library for quantum bits (qubits), quantum gates, and
quantum measurement. As a step towards verifying practical quantum communication and security
protocols such as Quantum Key Distribution, we support multiple qubits, communication and en-
tanglement. We illustrate these concepts by modelling the Quantum Teleportation Protocol, which
communicates the state of an unknown quantum bit using only a classical channel.
1 Introduction
Quantum cryptography aims to overcome the limitations of classical cryptography by providing perfect
security. The Quantum Key Distribution protocol by Bennett and Brassard (BB84) [4] showed how
quantum superposition and non-clonability of quantum states can be used to communicate a secret key,
while a posteriori verifying on an open line whether the communication has been intercepted. Thus, by
sacrificing a small portion of the transmitted key, it is possible to detect eavesdropping in almost 100%
of cases, which in turn, guarantees (almost) perfect secrecy when using the transmitted one-time key in
future communications. This protocol has been implemented in commercial products, e.g., by Id Quan-
tique [6], MagiQ [25], NEC and Toshiba, amongst others, and has been used in practical applications,
e.g., the Geneva election ballot count [29]. Various QKD networks have been built, including the DARPA
Quantum Network in Boston, the SeCoQC network around Vienna and the Tokyo QKD Network.
Physical restrictions of quantum communication, like preserving photon states over long distances,
are gradually being resolved, for example, by quantum repeaters [31] and using quantum teleportation,
i.e., transmission of quantum bits through a classical medium. There is no doubt that quantum communi-
cation and quantum cryptographic protocols will become an integral part of our society’s infrastructure.
On the theoretical side, quantum key distribution protocols such as BB84 have been proved to be
unconditionally secure [26]. It is important to understand that this is an information-theoretic proof,
which does not necessarily guarantee that implemented systems are unconditionally secure. That is why
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alternative approaches, such as those based on formal methods, could be useful in analysing behaviour
of implemented systems.
Quantum Formal Methods has been an active research area recently and quantum communication and
protocols have been investigated and formalised. Formal investigations of quantum protocols [14, 22, 33]
use languages for distributed communications, like CCS and the pi-calculus [27] or related formalisms.
Such formalisations enable reasoning about the properties of the quantum communication model using
techniques like type checking [15], as well as bisimulation and equational reasoning [23, 11, 12] for
these underlying languages. Other approaches which are more automated and tool-based include model
checking and equivalence checking [16, 13, 17, 1, 2]. In our approach, which we believe is new, we
directly formalise the mathematical model of quantum communication in constructive logic using the
Coq proof assistant. In this way, we build a mechanised and partly automated logical theory of quantum
communication. This theory allows the implementation of quantum cryptography protocols based on
their mathematical models and the proof of their properties. Moreover, since Coq’s logic is constructive,
extraction of code is possible.
The expressivity of Coq and its code extraction properties make it an interesting tool for the creation
of generic frameworks, i.e. abstract formalisations of practical specification and verification problems
that may be instantiated to various applications. A famous application of Coq is the formal proof of the
four colour theorem by Gonthier [18]. Another impressive achievement by Gonthier, together with oth-
ers, is the Coq proof of the Odd Order Theorem [19]. Coq has also been used for the formal verification of
large pieces of software, such as a C compiler in the CompCert project [24]. Other higher-order theorem
provers, such as Isabelle, HOL, NuPRL and PVS have been used in a variety of applications. Mathe-
maticians have also been using theorem proving techniques to formalise and prove difficult conjectures
and theorems. Vladimir Voevodsky and others are using Coq to formalise homotopy theory. Thomas
Hales has been working on a project called Flyspeck, formalising his proof of the Kepler conjecture in
the theorem prover HOL Light.
The contribution of this paper is a framework for modelling and proving quantum protocols in Coq
[21]. We assume that the reader is familiar with quantum theory and computing, for details we refer to the
book by Nielsen and Chuang [28] or the paper by Rieffel and Polak [32] tailored to computer scientists.
We provide a Coq library for quantum bits (qubits), quantum gates, and quantum measurement (Section
3). An important aspect of quantum information processing is the use of entanglement of qubits and
their transmission. Our Coq library also provides this, through measurement of qubit vectors (Section
4). Finally, we illustrate the functioning and application of entanglement and measurement by modelling
quantum teleportation (Section 5), which is a protocol that allows the use of so-called Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen (EPR) pairs of maximally entangled qubits to communicate the state of a qubit from Alice to Bob
using a pair of classical bits. This technique is crucial for realistic implementations of quantum protocols
over long distances by repeaters as mentioned earlier.
2 Interactive Proof in Coq
Interactive theorem proving is semi-automated proof development, usually in Higher Order Logic (HOL)
or some variant, like the Calculus of Indictive Constructions that underlies the interactive theorem prov-
ing system Coq [5, 21]. Coq’s logic is not classical: it is a constructive type theory interpreted as a logic
according to the Curry-Howard isomorphism [20]. Although constructivity imposes restrictions that can
be quite awkward at times, it offers one decisive advantage. Since all proofs are constructions of wit-
nesses, they are executable as programs. Program code can be extracted automatically from the Coq tool
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into the programming language OCaml which is also the implementation language of the Coq system.
Another advantage of Coq is that its type system is more powerful than the simple type theory that
is the basis for classical HOL. For example, the type system of Coq allows dependent types, which can
be used to represent universal and existential quantification. However, the type system is sufficiently
restricted that it remains decidable. Note, however, that there are some constructions in Coq that violate
decidability of type checking. Generally, type checking in Coq is decidable, but, as an example, pat-
tern matching constructions over dependent types can become undecidable. Coq also offers dependent
records and additionally a separate module system [8].
Coq’s original foundation, the Calculus of Inductive Constructions, has been extended to a calculus
of inductive constructions [9] that includes inductive definitions. Similar to a datatype definition in
a programming language like ML, an inductive definition in Coq consists of a set of rules describing
the signature of the constructors of the type. However, Coq’s logic, according to the Curry-Howard
isomorphism, is defined by its types. Therefore, an inductive definition may also be used to define logical
formulas. Using inductive definitions for the formalisation of computer science related subjects is very
natural, because types defined by an inductive definition automatically contain an induction principle and
so-called exhaustion properties that enable to reason by inversion. This means that, if we need to show a
property for all elements of a type, it suffices to make a case analysis over all different manifestations of
elements of the type given by the constructors of the inductive definition.
An excellent introduction to Coq is [7]. More concrete features of the Coq system will be explained
when we use them in the following sections.
Our quantum formalisation is work in progress and the current version is available online [30]. It
comprises around 2000 lines of Coq code. About 700 of these lines make up the specification of some
elementary matrix theory (there are existing matrix libraries in Coq, but these do not work together well
with the C-CoRN library). The development is discussed in the rest of the paper.
3 Qubits and Quantum Gates in Coq
For the formalisation of qubits and their basic infrastructure in Coq, we need theory libraries supporting
vector spaces and matrix operations. The constructive Coq repository C-CoRN at Nijmegen [10] offers
a mathematical library that we use as a starting point for the theory of real and complex numbers. We
give here just a short overview of the matrix operations defined in our framework. Further information
can be found in the attached online resources. Based on the C-CoRN module CRings for constructive
rings, we have built a module MatrixOps specifying the signature of m×n-matrices and their operations
over a ring. As operations, we define matrix equality using the notation {=}, matrix addition {+}, matrix
multiplication {*}, matrix scalar multiplication {**}. We also define tensor multiplication {o} needed
for multiple qubits (see Section 4). We specify the corresponding properties of these operations in module
MatrixSpec. As a first consistency check of our specification, we can already prove some algebraic
properties of matrices. Examples of such properties include facts such as matrices with addition form an
abelian (commutative) group. These proofs are contained in the module MatrixSetoid, which is used
in the main formalisation in the file Quantum.v, and will be further explained below.
Given this foundation, we can define qubits as complex column vectors.
Definition qubit (n: nat) :=
{q: matrix (2^n) 1 | vector_length q [=] [1]}
This notation defines qubit as a 2n × 1-matrix over the complex numbers CC, such that the vector
length is 1 (i.e. the vector is a unit vector). In this section, we only consider single qubits, i.e., n is 1.
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We provide basic infrastructures for qubits, for example, an equivalence relation and related proofs and
auxiliary lemmas. In order to create an element of the qubit n type, we will need to provide both a
matrix and a proof that the vector length of this matrix is 1.
We use our own matrix library for matrix operations. We have a type constructor that, given two
natural numbers, constructs a new Coq type representing a matrix:
Parameter matrix: nat -> nat -> Type.
The basis vectors can be defined for any number of qubits as follows. The following function basis
is auxiliary.
Definition basis n k: (matrix n 1) :=
create n 1 (fun i j =>
if eq_nat_dec (‘i) (S k)
then [1]
else [0]).
Then we add a lemma stating that any matrix created by calling basis represents a unit vector:
Lemma basis_length: forall n k,
k < 2^n -> vector_length (basis (2^n) k) [=] [1].
And finally we combine the function and the lemma into the definition of a qubit. We use the
exist function to combine the matrix created by calling basis and the proof from basis length into
a member of the qubit n type.
Definition basis_q {n} (i: nat | i < 2^n): qubit n :=
exist _ (basis (2^n) (‘i))
(basis_length (n) (‘i) (proj2_sig i)).
Note that, basis q 2 0 = [1; 0; 0; 0] and basis q 2 1 = [0; 1; 0; 0], etc. This is not
a bug, but a feature, since the superposition states of qubits necessitate higher dimensional vector spaces,
as we will see in Section 4.
In this development, we are using the standard basis for qubits. Of course, other bases can be used
just as easily, because measurement with respect to another basis is equivalent to applying a suitable
transformation and then measuring with respect to the standard basis.
Quantum gates over n qubits are now defined as the type of 2n×2n matrices.
Definition gate (n: nat) :=
{g:matrix (2^n) (2^n)|unitary g}.
Our matrix library is capable of using any ring as a coefficient algebra. The type gate is a definition
in the module Quantum representing the specific “subtype” of quadratic matrices over complex numbers.
This is achieved by the trailer in Quantum instantiating our module MatrixSetoid with C-CoRN’s
complex numbers CC as the base ring C and opening it with Import in the current context of the module
Quantum.
Declare Module Matrix: MatrixSetoid with
Definition C := (cf_crr CC).
Import Matrix.
We also use a dependent type to specify that gates are unitary matrices.
With this infrastructure at hand, we can define quantum gates in Coq. For example, the X gate is
defined as follows.
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Definition x_function
(i: nat | 0 < i <= 2) (j: nat | 0 < j <= 2): C :=
match ‘i, ‘j with
| 1, 2 | 2, 1 => [1]
| _, _ => [0]
end.
Program Definition x_gate: gate 1 :=
exist (fun x => unitary x) (create 2 2 x_function) _.
We first define a function that matches the specific matrix coordinates with the value at that coordi-
nate, and use this function to create a matrix. The create function works in such a way that if M is the
result of calling create with function f, then Mx,y = f x y (for all x and y that are valid coordinates for
the matrix M).
We use Coq’s Program extension to make working with dependent types easier. It will generate the
proof obligations that are needed and try to solve them automatically. Any obligations that cannot be
solved are left to the user to prove. In this case, there is only one proof obligation: we need to prove that
the matrix is unitary. This is easy to do, since the matrix is only 2 × 2 in size.
A gate represents a qubit transformation function. In order to apply a gate to a qubit we define the
following operator.
Program Definition apply {n} (q: qubit n) (g: gate n):
qubit n :=
exist (fun x => vector_length x [=] [1])
((‘g) {*} (‘q)) _.
This function multiplies the qubit and gate matrices. It needs some more syntax because of the de-
pendent types: first we discard the proofs from the g and q parameters (by using the backquote operator)
so that we keep only the actual matrices. These we multiply, and then we use exist to create a new
inhabitant of a dependent type. This is necessary, since the result is a qubit, so we will need to prove that
it is a unit vector. The Program extension again helps us to achieve this easily.
We formalise the Hadamard gate just like any of the other quantum gates as hadamard. In fact, it
is the same as the x gate shown above with the matrix entries Zero, One, One, Zero replaced by
onestwo, onestwo, onestwo, --onestwo.
Here onestwo represents 1√2 and the definition in Coq is as follows.
Definition onestwo: CC :=
Build_CC set (One [/] NRootIR.sqrt Two
(less_leEq _ _ _ (pos_two _)) [//] stwo pos) ZeroR.
The definition of division and square root in C-CoRN may seem complex but it integrates mathemat-
ical accuracy. The division operator has an extra argument (stwo pos) in order to ensure that the divisor
is not zero. Similarly, the square root function takes an extra argument that ensures that we do not take
the square root of a negative number.
4 Formalising Multiple Qubits, Measurement, and Entanglement
We now explain how tensor products, measurement and entanglement are formalised in our Coq frame-
work.
The Coq definition for the tensor product is a straightforward type of matrices.
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Parameter tensor_mult: forall m n p q,
matrix m n -> matrix p q -> matrix (m*p) (n*q).
The specification of tensor multiplication is the following.
Mi, jNk,l = Rp(i−1)+k,q( j−1)+l (1)
When we formalise this definition in Coq, we need to provide the proofs that the indices are within
bounds (for example, that 0 < p(i− 1)+ k ≤ m ∗ p). To state the fact that two indices that are within
the source matrices are also within bounds in the result matrix, we use the lemma tensor bounds (the
backquote is used to extract the number from the dependent type):
Lemma tensor_bounds: forall m p
(i: nat | 0 < i <= m) (k: nat | 0 < k <= p),
0 < p*(‘i-1)+(‘k) <= m*p.
This lemma can then be used in the specification of tensor product multiplication. To improve the
readability of formulas we define the infix notation {o} for tensor mult. The definition then maps the
tensor multiplication to the complex number multiplication [*] following the indexing of definition (1)
while supplying proofs that indices are in range.
Parameter tensor_mult_spec1:
forall m n p q (mx1: matrix m n) (mx2: matrix p q)
i j k l,
(mx1 {o} mx2) {exist (fun x => 0 < x <= m*p)
(p*(‘i-1)+‘k)
(tensor bounds m p i k),
exist (fun x => 0 < x <= n*q)
(q*(‘j-1)+‘l)
(tensor bounds n q j l)}
[=]
mx1 {i, j} [*] mx2 {k, l}.
In order to represent the use of the tensor product to combine gates and qubits, we prove the following
theorem (in MatrixTheory).
Theorem mult_dist_tensor: forall {m1 n1 p1 m2 n2 p2}
(mx1: matrix m1 n1) (mx2: matrix n1 p1)
(mx3: matrix m2 n2) (mx4: matrix n2 p2),
(mx1 {*} mx2) {o} (mx3 {*} mx4) {=}
(mx1 {o} mx3) {*} (mx2 {o} mx4).
4.1 Measurement
For modelling purposes, we can treat measurement of multiple qubits as sequential measurement of
single qubits.
In our model, measurement of a quantum state consists of taking the state (represented by the qubit
n Coq type) and a bit number, and then computing the probabilities of measuring a 0 or a 1 for that bit.
As a quantum state is represented by a matrix, and each element of this matrix represents one possible
measurement result, measuring one specific bit amounts to taking the sum of the relevant elements.
For example, in a three-qubit state, there are eight elements, of which the first represents the probabil-
ity of measuring 000, the second the probability of measuring 001, and so on. If we want to measure the
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second bit, the probability of measuring 0 for this bit is equal to the sum of the probabilities of measuring
000, 001, 100 and 101.
The sum pair function takes a bit number i and a quantum state q. It returns a pair of probabilities
for bit i: that of measuring 0 and that of measuring 1.
Definition sum_pair n i (q: qubit n): IR * IR :=
foldn (2^n) (2^n) (le_refl (2^n)) (fun k Hk acc =>
match acc with
| (acc1, acc2) =>
if digit_is_zero i k
then (acc1 [+]
AbsCC ((‘q) {exist _ _ (plusone _ _ Hk),
exist _ _ (plusone _ _ (lt_0_Sn 0))}) [^] 2,
acc2)
else (acc1, acc2 [+]
AbsCC ((‘q) {exist _ _ (plusone _ _ Hk),
exist _ _ (plusone _ _ (lt_0_Sn 0))}) [^] 2)
end
) ([0], [0]).
In order to compute the new quantum state after a measurement, half of the values in the matrix
will become 0 (if we have just measured that bit 5 is 0, then all the states that represent bit 5 being 1
have become impossible!). However, a quantum state is a unit vector, so we will have to normalise the
remaining values to keep this property. We do this by dividing each value by the sum of all remaining
values. In this way, the probability distribution for the bits that have not been measured remains the
same.
We need to be sure that this is not a division by zero. Therefore we introduce the following axiom,
saying that it is decidable whether the probability of measuring 0 or 1 for a given bit is 0 or not. This
is not very farfetched, since an event that has probability 0 will never happen. These axioms internalise
that knowledge.
Axiom sum_pair1: forall {n} (i: nat | i < n)
(q: qubit n),
fst (sum_pair (‘i) q) [=] [0] or
[0] [<] fst (sum_pair (‘i) q).
Axiom sum_pair2: forall {n} (i: nat | i < n)
(q: qubit n),
snd (sum_pair (‘i) q) [=] [0] or
[0] [<] snd (sum_pair (‘i) q).
Now we can define the function nqv (for ‘new qubit vector’) that computes the new quantum state
after a measurement. The parameter f should be either the identity function or the boolean NOT function.
This allows us to compute both the new quantum state after a measurement of 0 and after a measurement
of 1 with the same function. We also add the sum, or the probability of measuring the result, and a proof
that it is greater than 0, needed for the division.
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Definition nqv {n} (k: nat) (f: bool -> bool)
(sum: IR) (sum_proof: [0] [<] sum) (q: qubit n) :=
create (2^n) 1 (fun i j =>
if f (digit_is_zero k (‘i))
then (‘q) i, j [/]
cc_IR (NRootIR.sqrt sum (less_leEq _ _ _ sum_proof))
[//] (re_ap_zero _ (ap_symmetric _ _ _
(less_imp_ap _ _ _ (NRoot_pos _ _ _ _ sum_proof))))
else [0]
).
The division needs three arguments: two for the division operation and one for a proof that the divisor
is not 0.
Note that these functions are all auxiliary and not intended to be called on their own. The main
function that takes care of measurement is shown below.
Program Definition measure {n} (i: nat | i < n)
(q: qubit n): list (IR * qubit n) :=
match sum_pair1 i q with
| inl _ => (* zero *) [([1], q)]%list
| inr sum0_gt =>
match sum_pair2 i q with
| inl _ => (* zero *) [([1], q)]%list
| inr sum1_gt =>
[(fst (sum_pair i q),
existT _ (nqv (‘i) negb (fst (sum_pair i q))
sum0_gt q) _);
(snd (sum_pair i q),
existT _ (nqv (‘i) (fun x => x)
(snd (sum_pair i q)) sum1_gt q) _)]%list
end
end.
This function uses the sum pair axioms and the nqv function. It takes the two probabilities (of
measuring 0 and 1 for bit i) and computes the new quantum states that occur after this measurement. If
either probability is zero, we cannot compute the new state, because this would involve a divition by zero.
However, the fact that the probability is zero means that this situation will never occur. The sum pair
axioms are a way of externalising that knowledge.
4.2 Entanglement and EPR pairs
Measurement also allows us to think about entanglement. As mentioned earlier, definition of an entan-
gled state is a state that cannot be broken down as the tensor product of smaller states. However, in
constructive logics such as the one used by Coq, it is difficult to prove the absence of something—it
would require proving that any breakdown in some way leads to a contradiction. Fortunately, we can use
an alternative definition of entanglement which is specified in terms of measurement. Two qubits in a
quantum state are entangled if measuring one qubit changes the state of the other; a quantum state space
is entangled if it contains entangled qubits.
The advantage of this definition is that it is much easier to work with: we just need to show that two
qubits are entangled. In Coq, this definition becomes:
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Definition entangled_p n (q: qubit n)
(p1: nat | p1 < n) (p2: nat | p2 < n) :=
exists pr, exists res,
List.In (pr, res) (measure p1 q) /\
~(distribution_equal (measure p2 res) (measure p2 q)).
This then allows us to define entanglement: a state is entangled if it contains entangled qubits:
Definition entangled n (q: qubit n) :=
exists p1 p2, (‘p1) <> (‘p2) /\ entangled_p q p1 p2.
The distribution equal function determines whether two probability distributions are equal.
The entangled p definition, therefore, says that the probability of p2 being v in q must not be the
same as the probability of p2 being v in res, where res is the result of measuring p1 in q.
As a sanity check, we can now prove that the ‘maximally entangled’ EPR pair 1√2 (|00〉+ |11〉) is
indeed entangled:
Definition epr_function (i: nat | 0 < i <= 4)
(j: nat | 0 < j <= 1): C :=
match ‘i with
| 1 | 4 => onestwo
| _ => [0]
end.
Program Definition epr_1: qubit 2 :=
(exist (fun x => vector_length x [=] [1])
(create _ _ epr_function) _).
Lemma entangled: entangled epr_1.
Note how we specify a qubit: we simply give a vector with 4 elements and then explicitly note that
this is an element of qubit 2. Coq automatically checks that the types are equivalent.
We can also prove that the state 1√2(|0〉+ |1〉)⊗
1√
2(|0〉+ |1〉) is not entangled:
Lemma entangled2: ~entangled ([cc_IR Half;
cc_IR Half; cc_IR Half; cc_IR Half]: qubit 2).
5 Quantum Teleportation in Coq
The quantum teleportation procedure [3] allows the communication of the state of an unknown qubit,
from one party to another, via a classical (i.e., non-quantum) medium. According to the procedure, Alice
has a qubit φ = a|0〉+b|1〉 whose state she does not know and which she wishes to send to Bob. Alice and
Bob each control one qubit of the maximally entangled EPR pair ψ = 1√2(|00〉+ |11〉), i.e., we assume
that the entangled EPR pair ψ is shared between Alice and Bob. The translation of this protocol into
our Coq framework is relatively straightforward. We can use the definition of the maximally entangled
EPR pair ψ from the previous section (epr 1). Alice’s function is a sequence of transformations and
measurements applied to the qubit-vector composed of φ and ψ [32] leaving Bob’s third qubit unchanged
(I-gate).
Alice f = (H⊗ I⊗ I)(Cnot⊗ I)(φ ⊗ψ) .
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Alice then measures the first two qubits, thereby affecting Bob’s qubit via entanglement, and sends two
classical bits x,y encoding the outcome of this measurement to Bob. Bob can now restore φ in his second
qubit of the EPR-pair by simply applying the I,X ,Z or Y gate to it depending on x and y. The details of
the mathematical description [32] can be used one to one in the Coq definitions of teleportation below.
To compose the application of quantum gates, Alice employs the {o} operator which represents the
tensor product. She needs the c not gate and the Hadamard transformations composed with identity
transformations.
Definition firstgate: gate 3 := c_not_gate {o} identity.
Definition sndgate: gate 3 := hadamard {o} identity {o} identity.
The function Alice applies first the two gates firstgate and secondgate to the qubit triple phi {o}
epr 1 as defined in Alice f above. The first two qubits p1 and p2 of this application are then measured
using the constructor measure (see Section 4). The result of function Alice lists the different outcomes
of the measurement with their probabilities attached.
Definition Alice (phi: qubit 1): list (IR * qubit 3):=
measure p1 (measure p2 (apply (apply (phi {o} epr_1) firstgate) sndgate)).
An application of function Alice to a single qubit phi results in the following four possibilities; alpha
phi and beta phi are the components a,b, respectively, of qubit φ = a|0〉+b|1〉.
Definition Alice_pos (phi: qubit 1)(q: qubit 3):=
‘q = [alpha phi;beta phi;[0];[0];[0];[0];[0];[0]]
or
‘q = [[0];[0];beta phi;alpha phi;[0];[0];[0];[0]]
or
‘q = [[0];[0];[0];[0];alpha phi;[--](beta phi);[0];[0]]
or
‘q = [[0];[0];[0];[0];[0];[0];[--](beta phi);alpha phi]
The fact that the application of Alice’s function yields precisely those four possibilities is encoded in the
following theorem.
Theorem Alice_case: forall phi: qubit 1, forall q: qubit 3, forall r: IR,
List.In (r,q)(‘(Alice phi)) -> Alice_pos phi q.
For the transmission of the measurement of Alice’s first two qubits we need classical bits encoded as an
inductive type to enable subsequent pattern matching.
Inductive Bit : Set := | z | o.
Depending on the outcome of the measurement according to Alice pos, we define the following func-
tion that encodes this measurement in a pair of bits. The constructors inl and inr allow to pattern match
a disjunction in Coq.
Definition Alice_out(phi: qubit 1)(q: qubit 3)(qp: Alice_pos phi q): (Bit * Bit) :=
match qp with
| inl _ => (z,z)
| inr(inl _ ) => (z,o)
| inr(inr(inl _)) => (o,z)
| inr(inr(inr _)) => (o,o)
end.
Bob operates on the transformed qubit triple psix, i.e. φ ⊗ψ with the first two bits collapsed and the
third one—the one he controls—in an unknown state. But, using Coq’s pattern matching, Bob can restore
the original state of φ in his third qubit from the two classical bits he receives.
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Definition Bob (pxy: qubit 3 * (Bit* Bit)): qubit 3 :=
match pxy with
| (psix,(z,z)) => apply psix (exist (‘identity {o} ‘identity {o} ‘identity) )
| (psix,(z,o)) => apply psix (exist (‘identity {o} ‘identity {o} ‘x_gate) )
| (psix,(o,z)) => apply psix (exist (‘identity {o} ‘identity {o} ‘z_gate) )
| (psix,(o,o)) => apply psix (exist (‘identity {o} ‘identity {o} ‘y_gate) )
end.
Now, to formalise that the protocol does actually achieve the teleportation of Alice’s qubit φ , we can
simply state that the combination of Alice’s and Bob’s functions results in a triple of qubits whose last
element is the same as φ . Since Alice’s function used φ as its first qubit, this statement then encodes that
φ has been “teleported” from the first position to the third position, i.e., from Alice to Bob. The protocol
composes Alice’s function, given by the theorem Alice case, followed by sending the classical bits
using Alice out, and finally applying Bob’s decoding function. This combination can be applied to
any of the possible qubits q in the result list qp that is returned by Alice phi. The first two elements
measured and encoded in classical bits determine the qubit q. We represent these first two measured bits
by an existentially quantified qubit pair z. The proof of teleportation consists of showing that, for each
of the four possible outcomes for q, a suitable z exists.
Theorem teleportation:
forall phi: qubit 1, forall q: qubit 3,
forall pr: IR, forall qp: List.In (pr, q)‘(Alice phi),
exists z: qubit 2,
‘Bob(q, Alice_out phi q (Alice_case phi q pr qp)) {=} ‘(z {o} phi).
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a framework for modelling and analysing quantum protocols using the proof assistant
Coq. The framework makes it possible to represent and reason about all the essential features of quantum
systems such as single and multiple qubits, quantum gates, measurement and entanglement. We have
modelled and analysed the canonical example of Quantum Teleportation. As mentioned earlier, model-
checking and equivalence checking techniques have been used for verification of quantum protocols.
The work in this paper also opens up the possibility of combining theorem proving with these (more
automatic) approaches to greater gain.
The framework uses existing Coq libraries as much as possible, though a new matrix library had to
be developed. This library can also be used independently. Both the library and the framework make
use of dependent types. This can make the proofs more complicated, but it allows for more concise
formulations of key lemmas. We intend to push the use of dependent types still further during future
development of the framework.
Future work will aim to look at simplifying some definitions, improving the specifications and en-
hancing the general readability of the Coq code. We will also investigate using linear typing as a way
to incorporate the notion of non-cloneability of quantum states in our framework. Our Coq development
is already quite substantial and contains most of the necessary features to analyse large scale examples.
In the near future, we hope to apply it to various case studies ranging from Quantum Bit Commitment
and Blind Quantum Computing to Quantum Error Correction Protocols. Of course, an ambitious and
challenging project which we have in mind is to formalise and prove the security of Quantum Key Dis-
tribution using Coq.
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